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Introduction 
 This chapter uses the term “neuroscience” to refer to brain imaging in 
individual cases, especially using non-invasive techniques such as structural 
and functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI and fMRI, respectively) 
and to reliance on studies about the relation between the brain and behavior 
that use non-invasive imaging.  The issue is whether the use of these newer 
techniques and the data from studies employing them raise new ethical 
issues for forensic psychiatrists and psychologists.  The implicit thesis 
throughout is that if the legal questions, the limits of the new techniques and 
the relevance of neuroscience to law are properly understood, no new ethical 
issues are raised.  A major ethical lapse would occur if practitioners use 
neuroscience without the proper understanding. 
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Brain imaging and neuropsychological methods have always been 
admissible in personal injury or malpractice suits to answer questions about 
brain injuries and lesions that are typically medically well-characterized.  In 
such cases, the image or test data is directly relevant to the question of 
whether the plaintiff had an injury or lesion.  This is the forensic use of the 
old neurology, neuropsychology and neuroradiology and this chapter does 
not address the ethical issues in such cases.1  Instead, it addresses the 
question of the relevance of the newer techniques of brain imaging to 
forensic legal criteria that are behavioral, that is, that require evaluation of a 
subject’s mental states and actions.  For examples, did a defendant charged 
with homicide kill the victim intentionally, or is the defendant competent to 
stand trial.  In these cases, the imaging will be inferentially relevant. 
I begin with brief discussion of the legal standard for the admissibility 
of scientific and technical evidence.  Then I turn to the proper understanding 
of legal questions to guide forensic work.   I will use examples from the 
criminal law, but the analysis generalizes to behavioral criteria in the civil 
law, such as whether a person is competent to contract or whether a decedent 
was competent to make a valid will.  The next section considers the current 
                                                 
1 Neuroradiologists have published an analysis of the ethical issues for that specialty with recommendations 
based on a consensus conference held at Emory University in 2013 (Meltzer et al. 2014).  Full disclosure: 
the author of this chapter was one of the participants at the conference.  
3 
 
state of cognitive, affective and social neuroscience, which will be most 
relevant to law.  I will assume in this section that the research design (where 
relevant) was appropriate, the image was acquired properly, and the analysis 
was sound. It is of course true that some expert testimony does not meet this 
standard, even if it is improperly admitted.  Nonetheless, I shall ignore that 
problem and focus instead on what I consider the greater problem: the 
general limits of current neuroscience.   
The following section uses the analysis of the preceding two sections 
to address the question of legal relevance. In short, the question is, “How, 
precisely, does the proffered scan or data based on scanning answer the 
specific legal question it supposedly helps answer?”  I term this the problem 
of “translation.”  I conclude that, at present, brain imaging has little 
relevance to behavioral legal criteria.  The primary exception is cases in 
which the subject has a well-characterized brain abnormality, such as 
epilepsy, that may be probative of a legal question, such as whether a 
criminal defendant’s harmful bodily movements were “acts” as the criminal 
law defines action.  This section also reports the findings of five recent 
studies that investigated the reception of neuroscience in criminal cases in 
four countries. The conclusion that follows addresses the ethical issues 
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directly, and takes note of the rampant disorder, Brain Overclaim Syndrome, 
and offers a remedy. 
 
Brief Legal Preliminaries 
 Forensic practitioners understand that expert opinion and testimony 
are needed when the subject matter is beyond the ken of the ordinary lay 
person’s understanding.  Whether the testimony will be admissible will be 
decided according to the applicable rules for scientific and technical 
evidence in force in a jurisdiction.  In general, testimony will be admissible 
if the scientific or technical methods and data being proffered are 
scientifically and technically valid and have been reliably applied to the facts 
of the case and if the testimony is legally relevant.  Legal relevance is judged 
by whether the evidence makes a legally determinative fact more or less 
probative than it would be without the evidence.  Even if evidence meets this 
standard, a judge typically has the power to exclude it if the testimony’s 
probative value would be outweighed by the dangers of it causing unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting 
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence (e.g., Federal Rules of 
Evidence, Sec. 403, which has been adopted by a majority of states).  All 
these considerations will apply to evidence based on neuroscience. 
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 Experts are also expected to adhere to the ethical standards of their 
discipline, but typically this is raised only if there is a substantial breach that 
casts doubt on the integrity of the process and its outcome.  Otherwise, such 
matters are left to the disciplinary standards and procedures of the profession 
involved.  Perhaps the most extreme example of the difference between legal 
and professional response to misconduct occurred in Barefoot v. Estelle 
(1983), in which the Supreme Court was asked to decide if in a capital 
punishment proceeding a psychiatrist’s opinion about future dangerousness 
based on hypothetical questions and no personal evaluation violated due 
process.  The psychiatrist, an infamous Dallas doctor named John Grigson 
had testified in a large number of capital cases that the convict was certain to 
kill again if not executed, which was his testimony in this case.  The jury 
sentenced Barefoot to death.  The American Psychiatric Association and 
others all supported petitioner, Barefoot, and considered this “expert” 
opinion utterly unjustified as a matter of psychiatric expertise.  The Supreme 
Court nonetheless held that admitting the testimony did not violate due 
process and that any deficiencies in it were matters of weight that could be 
tested with cross-examination.  Grigson was reprimanded twice and finally 
expelled from the American Psychiatric Association, but he never lost his 
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medical license and continued doing forensic work until he retired.  Thomas 
Barefoot was executed. 
The Law’s Psychology and Legal Criteria 
The law’s psychology is folk psychology.  When I write about the law’s 
psychology, I am not claiming that there is a reified anthropomorphic entity, 
“The Law,” that has somehow officially adopted a psychology.  I am offering 
a goodness of fit interpretation of legal doctrine and practice.   Folk 
psychology is an explanatory causal theory that explains human behavior in 
part using mental state variables, such as desires, beliefs, plans, and 
intentions.  For example, part of the explanation for why you are reading this 
chapter is, roughly, that you desire to learn more about the subject to improve 
your forensic work; you believe that reading it will achieve that goal, and, 
therefore, you formed the intent to read it and are doing so.  This is a practical 
syllogism, not a deductive one.  Of course, this is only a partial explanation.  
A full explanation would be multifield/multilevel, using variables from 
biology at various levels, other psychological variables, and sociological 
variables.  Folk psychological theorists may differ about mental state 
categories and how they should be individuated, but all agree that mental 
states are part of the explanation of human behavior.  Folk psychology does 
not insist that the causal mental variables must be conscious and that every 
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action is preceded by a practical syllogism of the type used earlier.  It simply 
claims that mental states are consciously causal or rationalize actions, 
including mental state actions, that may not have been preceded by conscious 
causal thought. 
Many scientists think that folk psychology is primitive or false.  I and 
many others, including those who are expert in the science and philosophy of 
mind and action (e.g. Fodor 1987), think the critics are wrong.  For now, 
however, we do not have to resolve this question because we are simply 
providing a descriptive account of the law as it is, not a prescriptive account 
of the law as some scientists or others might prefer it to be.  People may be 
critical of the law’s underlying assumptions and policies based on them, but 
no legally sophisticated commentator would deny that the account provided is 
accurate.  
Existing legal criteria for responsibility and competence are completely 
folk psychological—actions and mental states.  Again, no legally 
sophisticated commentator would disagree, and, at some level, every 
practicing forensic practitioner knows this.  Nonetheless, it is so familiar that 
it is easy to forget, but doing so is perilous because then one runs the risk of 
doing irrelevant or misleading forensic work.  There are no brain or other 
biological criteria in any of the criminal and civil law contexts in which 
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forensic practitioners work.  For example, competence to stand trial requires 
that the defendant has a rational understanding of the charges and proceedings 
and is able rationally to assist counsel.  These are criteria about the 
defendant’s level of understanding—a mental state issue—and about his 
ability rationally to communicate with and otherwise work effectively with 
counsel—action and mental state criteria.  The standard is entirely 
behaviorally functional.  An insanity defense obtains if a mental disorder 
results in a defendant’s inability to know right from wrong.  The mental 
disorder criterion is itself proved behaviorally by considering the defendant’s 
cognition, mood and other mental state variables.  As is well known, there is 
no imaging test sensitive enough yet to diagnose mental disorder, including 
major mental disorder.  I might also add in passing that the mental disorder 
criterion in any legal doctrine is a legal test and not a biological, psychiatric or 
psychological test.  Knowing right from wrong is a mental state issue. 
Now let us briefly address some issues that are often misunderstood by 
non-lawyers (and sometimes even by lawyers, who should know better!). 
Metaphysical, libertarian free will, the ability to act uncaused by anything 
other than one’s own agency, is not a criterion for any legal doctrine and it is 
not even foundational for any part of the law (Morse 2007).  Causation, 
whether by biological, psychological, sociological, or some combination of 
9 
 
variables, is not per se an excusing or mitigating condition in law.  All 
behavior is caused in a causal universe.  If causation per se were an excuse, 
everyone would always be excused.  Many people think that this is correct, 
but it is not the law we have, which excuses some people but finds most 
people responsible and competent.  All action is caused, but not all action is 
excused.  Causation only excuses if it produces a genuine excusing condition, 
such as lack of rational capacity, but in that case, it is the lack of rational 
capacity, a behavioral criterion, that is doing the excusing work.  Causation is 
not the equivalent of compulsion, which can be an excusing condition.  If all 
caused behavior were compelled, then all behavior would be compelled and 
everyone would always be excused. But it is clear that not everyone is 
compelled all the time.  Presumably no one is compelling you in any ordinary 
sense of the term to read this chapter, say, by threatening you with death if 
you do not read it.  Finally, predictability is also not an excusing condition.  
Much of our behavior is completely predictable by ourselves and others, but 
unless some simultaneous, genuine excusing condition exists when we act 
predictably, we are responsible for our predictable behavior. 
When considering the relation between the data from any other field to 
legal questions, it is crucial to understand the question under consideration.  
Unless, it is understood, it will be difficult to properly apply the other data to 
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it.  And that is what forensic psychiatrists and psychologists do for a living.  
They use their specialty methods and data to help answer a legal question.  
Whether they use the result of a diagnostic interview, a rating scale, a 
psychological test, or a brain scan, they are trying to relate their expert 
knowledge to the legal issue at stake.  After examining the state of legally-
relevant current neuroscience, in a later section we will turn specifically to the 
relevance of the new neuroscience to the practice of forensic psychiatry and 
psychology. 
The Status of Current New Neuroscience 
 Most generally, the relation of brain, mind, and action is one of the 
hardest problems in all science. We have no idea how the brain enables the 
mind, how consciousness is produced, and how action is possible (Adolphs 
2015, 175; McHugh and Slavney 1998, 11–12). The brain-mind-action 
relation is a mystery not because it is inherently not subject to scientific 
explanation, but because the problem is so difficult. For example, we would 
like to know the difference between a neuromuscular spasm and 
intentionally moving one’s arm in exactly the same way. The former is a 
purely mechanical motion, whereas the latter is an action, but we cannot 
explain the difference between the two. Wittgenstein, famously asked: “Let 
us not forget this: when ‘I raise my arm,’ my arm goes up. And the problem 
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arises: what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the 
fact that I raise my arm?” (Wittgenstein 1953, sec. 621). We know that a 
functioning brain is a necessary condition for having mental states and for 
acting. After all, if your brain is dead, you have no mental states and are not 
acting. Still, we do not know how mental states and action are caused. 
Wittgenstein’s question cannot be answered yet. 
Despite the astonishing advances in neuroimaging and other 
neuroscientific methods—especially in understanding systems such as vision 
and memory, for example—we still do not have sophisticated causal 
knowledge of how the brain works generally, and we have little information 
that is directly or even indirectly morally or legally relevant. The scientific 
problems are fearsomely difficult. Only in the present century have 
researchers begun to accumulate much data from fMRI imaging. New 
methodological problems are constantly being discovered (e.g., Bennett, 
Wolford, and Miller 2009; Button et al. 2013; Eklund, Nichols, and 
Knutsson 2016; Vul, Harris, Winkielman, and Pashler 2009; but see 
Lieberman, Berkman, and Wager 2009, for a contrary view). This is not 
surprising, given how new the science is. Moreover, although there are good 
studies of the neural correlates of legal decision-making, virtually no studies 
have been performed to address specifically legally-relevant questions that 
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would be relevant to practitioners and policy-makers. Law and forensic 
psychiatry and psychology should not expect too much of a young science 
that uses new technologies to investigate some of the most intrinsically 
difficult problems in science and that does not directly address questions of 
normative interest. Caution is warranted, although many would think the 
argument of this chapter is too cautious. 
Furthermore, neuroscience is insufficiently developed to detect 
specific, legally relevant mental content or to provide a sufficiently accurate 
diagnostic marker for even a severe mental disorder (Frances 2009; Morse 
and Newsome 2013, 150, 159–160, 167). Many studies do find differences 
between patients with mental disorders and controls, but the differences are 
too small to be used diagnostically, and publication bias may have inflated 
the number of such positive studies (Ioannidis 2011). There are limited 
exceptions for some genetic disorders that are diagnosed using genomic 
information or some well-characterized neurological disorders such as 
epilepsy that is definitively diagnosed using electroencephalography (EEG), 
but these are not the types of techniques that are central to the new 
neuroscience based primarily on imaging. Indeed, when the American 
Psychiatric Association published its most recent version of the authoritative 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-
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5) in 2013, it conceded that no validated neurological diagnostic markers for 
major mental disorders such as schizophrenia and major affective disorder 
had been identified. Nothing has changed since then (Rego 2016, who also 
claims that dementias may be an exception.) 
Nonetheless, certain aspects of neural structure and function that bear 
on legally relevant capacities, such as the capacity for rationality and 
control, may be temporally stable in general or in individual cases. If they 
are, neuroevidence may permit a reasonably valid retrospective inference 
about, for example, a criminal defendant’s rational and control capacities 
and their impact on criminal behavior. Some legal questions, such as 
whether a defendant is competent and what the agent will do in the future, 
depend on current rather than retrospective evaluation of the agent. Such 
evaluations will be easier than retrospective evaluation. Nonetheless, both 
types of evaluation will depend on the existence of adequate neuroscience to 
aid such evaluations. With the exception of a few well-characterized medical 
disorders, such as epilepsy, we currently lack such science (Morse and 
Newsome 2013), but future research may provide the necessary data. 
Let us consider the specific grounds for modesty about the current 
achievements of cognitive, affective, and social neuroscience, the sub-
disciplines most relevant to forensic psychiatry and psychology. fMRI is still 
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a rather blunt instrument to measure brain functioning. It measures the 
amount of oxygenated blood that is flowing to a specific region of the brain 
(the blood oxygen dependent level [BOLD] signal), which is a proxy for the 
amount of neural activation that is occurring in that region above or below 
baseline activation (the brain is always and everywhere physiologically 
active). There is good reason to believe that the BOLD signal is a good 
proxy, but it is only a proxy. The time lag between alleged activation and 
measurement and its spatial resolution are less than optimal (Roskies 2013). 
These difficulties will surely be ameliorated by technological advances, but 
studies to date, especially if they used lower power scanners, do suffer from 
these limitations. 
There are research design difficulties. It is extraordinarily difficult to 
control for all conceivable artifacts; that is, other variables that may also 
produce a similar result. The same region of interest (ROI) may produce 
opposite behaviors, which also confounds inferences. 
At present, most neuroscience studies on human beings involve small 
numbers of subjects, which makes it difficult to achieve statistically 
significant results and which undermines the validity of significant findings 
(Button et al. 2013; Szucs and Ioannidis 2016). This phenomenon will 
change as the cost of scanning decreases and future studies will have more 
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statistical power, but this is still a major problem. Most of the studies in 
cognitive, affective, and social neuroscience have been done on college and 
university students who are hardly a random sample of the population 
generally. 
Many of the studies use other animals, such as rats or primates, as 
subjects. Although the complexity and operation of the neural structure and 
function of other animals may be on a continuum with those of human 
beings and there may be complete similarity at some level, there is reason to 
question the applicability of the neuroscience of behavior of other animals to 
humans. The human brain is capable of language and rationality, which 
mark an immense difference between humans and other animals. To the best 
of our knowledge, other animals do not act for and are not responsive to 
reasons in the full-blown sense that intact human beings are. Is so-called 
altruistic behavior in orangutans, for example, the same as altruistic behavior 
in humans? Although the point should not be overstated, we should be 
cautious about extrapolating to human action from the neuroscience of the 
behavior of other animals. 
Most studies average the neurodata over the subjects, and the average 
finding may not accurately describe the brain structure or function of any 
actual subject in the study. This leads to a more general problem about the 
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applicability of group data to an individual subject, a problem called G2i for 
“group to individual” (Faigman, Monahan, and Slobogin 2014).  Scientists 
are interested in how the world works and produce general information. Law 
is often concerned with individual cases, and it is difficult to know how 
properly to apply relevant group data. For example, a neuroscience study 
that reports increased activation in some ROI bases its conclusion on 
averaging the activation across all the subjects, but no subject’s brain may 
have activated precisely in the area identified. If such group data are 
permitted, as they now are for functions such as predictions, the question is 
how to use probabilistic data to answer what is often a binary question, such 
as whether to release a prisoner to parole because he is deemed no longer a 
danger to society. This is a topic under intensive investigation at present, and 
I assume progress will be made.  The forensic practitioner presenting group 
data must understand that this is a fraught, complicated topic. 
A serious question is whether findings based on subjects’ behavior 
and brain activity in a scanner would apply to real-world situations. This is 
known as the problem of “ecological validity.” Does a subject’s performance 
in a laboratory while being scanned on an executive function task that inter 
alia allegedly measures the ability to control impulses really predict that 
person’s ability to resist criminal offending, for example? 
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Replications are few, which is especially important for any discipline, 
such as law, that has public policy implications and often immense 
consequences in individual cases (Chin 2014). Policy and adjudication 
should not be influenced by findings that are insufficiently established, and 
replications of findings are crucial to our confidence in a result, especially 
given the problem of publication bias (Ioannidis 2011) and reproducibility 
skepticism (Chin 2014; Open Science Collaboration 2015; but see, Gilbert, 
King, Pettigrew, and Wilson 2016 for a critique of the Open Science 
Collaboration paper that concludes that the point is not proven). Indeed, 
replications are so few in this young science and the power is so low that one 
should be wary of the ultimate validity of many results. Indeed, a recent 
analysis by Szucs and Ioannidis (2016) suggests that more than 50 percent of 
cognitive neuroscience studies may be invalid and not reproducible. 
Drawing extended inferences from findings is especially unwarranted at 
present. If there are numerous studies of various types that seem valid, all 
converge on a similar finding, and there is theoretical reason to believe they 
should be consistent, then lack of replication of any one of them may not 
present such a large problem. The congruence of behavioral science and 
anatomical imaging studies showing an average difference between 
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adolescence and young adults is a good example. But such examples are at 
present few, especially in legally-relevant neuroscience.2  
The neuroscience of cognition and interpersonal behavior is largely in 
its infancy, and what is known is quite coarse-grained and correlational 
rather than fine-grained and causal (Miller 2010). What is being investigated 
is an association between a condition or a task in the scanner and brain 
activity. These studies do not demonstrate that the brain activity is a 
sensitive diagnostic marker for the condition being investigated or either a 
necessary, sufficient, or predisposing causal condition for the behavioral task 
that is being performed in the scanner. Any language that suggests 
otherwise—such as claiming that some brain region is the neural substrate 
for the behavior—is simply not justifiable based on the methodology of most 
studies. Such inferences are only justified if everything else in the brain 
remained constant, which is seldom the case (Adolphs 2015) or if the 
investigator is able experimentally to temporarily disable some ROI, as has 
been done in some studies.  
                                                 
2 These data were cited by the United States Supreme Court in the “juvenile trilogy” 
of Roper v. Simmons (2005; although this case cited only to behavioral science), Graham 
v. Florida (2010) and Miller v. Alabama (2012) to argue that adolescents are generally less 
responsible than adults.  
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Law and forensic psychiatry and psychology are concerned with 
human mental states and actions. What is the relevance of neuroscientific 
evidence to decision-making concerning human behavior? If the behavioral 
data are not clear, then the potential contribution of neuroscience is large. 
Unfortunately, it is in just such cases that neuroscience at present is not 
likely to be of much help. I term the reason for this the “clear-cut” problem 
(Morse 2011), and it is a major difficulty. Virtually all neuroscience studies 
of potential interest to the law involve some behavior that has already been 
identified as of interest, and the point of the study is to identify that 
behavior’s neural correlates. Neuroscientists do not go on general “fishing” 
expeditions (but see Bennett, Baird, Miller, and Wolford 2009, for an 
amusing exception). There is usually some bit of behavior—such as 
addiction, schizophrenia, or impulsivity—that investigators would like to 
understand better by investigating its neural correlates. To do this properly 
presupposes that the researchers have already well-characterized and 
validated the behavior under neuroscientific investigation. Cognitive, social, 
and affective neuroscience are inevitably embedded in a matrix involving 
allied sciences, such as cognitive science and psychology. Thus, neurodata 
can very seldom be more valid than the behavior with which it is correlated. 
In such cases, the neural markers might be quite sensitive to the already 
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clearly identified behaviors precisely because the behavior is so clear. Less 
clear behavior is simply not studied, or the overlap in data about less clear 
behavior is greater between experimental and comparison subjects. Thus, the 
neural markers of clear cases will provide little guidance to resolve 
behaviorally ambiguous cases of relevant behavior, and they are unnecessary 
if the behavior is sufficiently clear.  It is in unclear, “gray area” cases that 
forensic practitioners and the law need help the most, but it is in precisely 
these cases, alas, that the neuroscience is least helpful. 
On occasion, the neuroscience might suggest that the behavior is not 
well-characterized or is neurally indistinguishable from other, seemingly 
different behavior.  In general, however, the existence of relevant behavior 
will already be apparent before the neuroscientific investigation is begun. 
For example, some people are grossly out of touch with reality. If, as a 
result, they do not understand right from wrong, we excuse them because 
they lack such knowledge. We might learn a great deal about the neural 
correlates of such psychological abnormalities. But we already knew without 
neuroscientific data that these abnormalities existed, and we had a firm view 
of their legal significance. In the future, however, we may learn more about 
the causal link between the brain and behavior, and studies may be devised 
that are more directly legally relevant. Indeed, my best hope is that 
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neuroscience and law will each richly inform the other and perhaps help 
reach what I term a conceptual-empirical equilibrium in some areas. I 
suspect that we are unlikely to make substantial progress with neural 
assessment of mental content, but we are likely to learn more about 
capacities that will bear on excuse or mitigation. 
Here is an example of the current limitations of neuroscience for legal 
conclusions. A neuroscientist and I reviewed all the behavioral neuroscience 
that might possibly be relevant to criminal law adjudication and policy. With 
the exception of a few already well-characterized medical conditions, such 
as epilepsy, our review found virtually no solid neuroscience findings that 
were yet relevant (Morse and Newsome 2013). Similar conclusions were 
reached after reviews of “brain reading” studies, such as “neural lie 
detection” (Greely 2013) and the addictions (Husak and Murphy 2013). 
These conclusions are unsurprising. Behavioral neuroscience is a new 
discipline that is working on problems of immense conceptual and scientific 
complexity. Future conceptual and technological advances will certainly 
improve our knowledge base, but, for now, modesty is in order about what 
neuroscience can teach us that is relevant to adjudication, legal policy-
making, and the practice of forensic psychiatry and psychology.  This is 
sobering news, but the good news is that it means that for the foreseeable 
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future, forensic psychiatry and psychology will be essential to help law 
understand the acting human being who is the subject of legal interest 
(Morse 2015).  Neuroscience will not supplant these specialties. 
 
The Problem of Legal Relevance: Lost in Translation? 
  Let us begin this section with an observation that will always be 
germane even if neuroscience makes huge leaps forward. Neuroscience is a 
purely mechanistic science. Neurons, neural networks, and the connectome 
do not have reasons. They have no aspirations, no sense of past, present, and 
future. These are properties of agents, of acting human beings. Ethics and 
law are addressed to agents. Thus, there will always be a problem of 
translation between the pure mechanism of neuroscience and the folk 
psychology of law. Neuroscience eschews folk-psychological concepts and 
discourse. Thus, the gap will be harder to bridge.  Paradoxically, however, 
neuroscientists frequently write dualistically by suggesting that regions of 
the brain are little homunculi that do things and that there seems to be a 
struggle between the self and the brain as an independent agent (Mudrik and 
Maoz 2014).  The translation problem is thus a much greater problem for 
neuroscience than for psychiatry and psychology. The latter sometimes treat 
people as mechanisms but also treat them as agents. Consequently, they are 
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in part folk psychological, and the translation will be easier. It is the task of 
forensic practitioners always to explain precisely how neuroscientific 
findings, assuming that they are valid, are relevant to an ethical or legal 
issue. No hand waving is allowed. 
 The brain does enable the mind (even if we do not know how this 
occurs).  Therefore, the facts we learn about brains in general or about a 
specific brain could in principle provide useful information about mental 
states and about human capacities in general and in specific cases.  Some 
believe that this conclusion is entirely or largely a category error (Bennett and 
Hacker 2003; Pardo and Patterson 2013).  This is a plausible view, and 
perhaps it is correct.  If it is, then the whole subject of this chapter is empty, 
and there was no point writing it.  Let us therefore bracket this pessimistic 
view and determine what follows from the more optimistic position that what 
we learn about the brain and nervous system can be potentially helpful to 
resolving questions of criminal responsibility and other legal issues if the 
findings are properly translated into the law’s folk psychological framework. 
The question is whether some concededly valid neuroscience is legally 
relevant because it makes a proposition about responsibility or competence 
more or less likely to be true.  Biological variables, including abnormal 
biological variables, do not per se answer any legal question because the law’s 
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criteria are not biological.  For instance, even a biological abnormality that 
seems causally related to criminal behavior does not per se establish that the 
defendant was not rational or could not control himself.  The famous case of 
Mr. Oft, whose right orbital frontal tumor caused pedophilic desires that were 
then acted on, is a perfect example (Burns and Swerdlow 2003; see Morse 
2011, for an analysis of this case).  For another example, even if criminal 
behavior is a sign of an established disorder, it does not follow that the 
defendant must be mitigated or excused.  Any legal criterion, such as lack of 
rational or control capacity, must be established independently, and biological 
evidence must be translated into the criminal law’s folk-psychological criteria.  
That is, the advocate for using the data must be able to explain precisely how, 
for example,  the neurodata bear on whether the agent acted, formed the 
required mens rea, or met the criteria for an excusing or mitigating condition.  
In the context of civil and criminal competence evaluations, the forensic 
practitioner must explain precisely how the neuroevidence bears on whether 
the subject was capable of meeting the law’s functional criteria.   
If the evidence is not directly relevant, the advocate should be able to 
explain the chain of inference from the indirect evidence to the law’s criteria.  
At present, few such data exist that could be the basis of such an inferential 
chain of reasoning (Morse and Newsome 2013), but neuroscience is 
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advancing so rapidly that such data may exist in the near or medium term.   
Even if neuroscience does seem relevant to a legal issue, the concerns 
with prejudice, cumulation and the other issues the rules of evidence, such as 
Federal Rule 403, raise must be considered.  The common wisdom about 
imaging data was that it was prejudicial compared to other, equally valid 
sources of evidence, such as purely verbal expert testimony or psychological 
testing, That is, juries were likely to give brain images undue weight.  More 
recent, better designed studies have disclosed that this worry appears 
unjustified.  With limited exceptions, decision makers do not give undue 
weight to imaging data. (Roskies 2013; Schweitzer et al. 2011).  The issue is 
not resolved empirically yet, but the default must be that the evidence is not 
prejudicial. 
The more pressing concern is the value-added of imaging.  A scan is 
relatively expensive and somewhat time consuming.  It thus has the potential 
for waste and delay unless there is genuine value-added.  More important, 
legally relevant neuroimages must be based on good prior behavioral science 
that identifies clearly the behavior to which the brain structure or function will 
be correlated.  This raises the problem of cumulation.  For example, studies of 
the anatomical abnormalities associated with schizophrenia must have clearly 
identified whether the subjects in fact met the diagnostic criteria for the 
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disorder using behavioral criteria to make the diagnosis.  Thus, we already 
knew behaviorally that the person suffered from schizophrenia.  What does 
the scan add?   For another example, the law has treated adolescents 
differently from adults for centuries based on undoubted average behavioral 
differences between adolescents and adults.  Recall that the criteria for 
responsibility are behavioral.  What does the diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) 
scanning data about incomplete myelination and pruning in adolescence add 
to what we already knew?  It is potentially causal information and it is 
comforting that the brain data are consistent with the behavioral data.  But the 
latter were already clear. After all, we have had a juvenile court system for 
over a hundred years and the common law had an immaturity defense for 
centuries.  It is unsurprising in light of the behavioral differences that there are 
brain differences, but would we believe adolescents are not behaviorally 
different if the current brain imaging data did not show a difference?  Thus, in 
individual cases where the behavior is clear, the imaging data will be 
cumulative and unnecessary.   
But, might not neuroscience be especially helpful in cases in which the 
behavioral evidence is unclear? The answer in principle is that of course it 
would be helpful, but as a practical matter it will not be because the neurodata 
is based on correlations with clear behavioral data. The “clear cut” issue 
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identified in the previous section is the major stumbling block.   Where the 
behavior is unclear, the neurodata will not be sufficiently sensitive to help 
resolve the behavioral issue even if the neurodata can distinguish the already 
behaviorally clear cases.  These types of problems might be remedied by 
future advances in neuroscience, but such breakthroughs do not appear on the 
horizon yet. 
A final point about the translation problem is that actions speak louder 
than images with very few exceptions.  The law’s criteria are behavioral—
actions and mental states.  If the finding of any test or measurement of 
behavior is contradicted by actual behavioral evidence, then we must believe 
the behavioral evidence because it is more direct and probative of the law’s 
behavioral criteria.  For example, if an agent behaves rationally in a wide 
variety of circumstances, the agent is rational even if his or her brain appears 
structurally or functionally abnormal. We confidently knew that some people 
were behaviorally abnormal—such as being psychotic—long before there 
were any psychological or neurological tests for such abnormalities.  In 
contrast, if the agent is clearly psychotic, then a potentially legally-relevant 
rationality problem exists even if the agent’s brain looks entirely normal. 
An analogy from physical medicine may be instructive.  Suppose 
someone who has been in a workplace accident and is seeking disability 
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compensation complains about disabling back pain, a subjective symptom, 
and the question is whether the subject actually does have such severe pain.  
We know that many people with abnormal spines do not experience back 
pain, and many people who complain of back pain have normal spines.  If the 
person is claiming a disability and the spine looks dreadful, evidence that the 
person regularly exercises on a trampoline without difficulty indicates that 
there is no disability caused by back pain.  There is no good test to identify 
malingering, neural or psychological.  If there is reason to suspect 
malingering, then neurodata may be useful in a common sense fashion.  In the 
example given, if there is not clear behavioral evidence of lack of pain, then a 
completely normal spine might be of use in deciding whether the claimant is 
malingering. 
Unless the correlation between the image and the legally relevant 
behavior is very powerful, however, such evidence will be of limited help. If a 
biomarker were virtually perfectly correlated with a legal criterion and it was 
less expensive to collect the biological data than behavioral data, then the 
biological variable might be a good proxy for a legal criterion.  But this 
would be possible only with clear, bright line legal rules and not with 
standards, such as whether a reasonable person would be aware of a 
particular circumstance, because the latter have an inevitable normative 
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component for the decision maker to assess.  Further, standards can evolve, 
and trying to use an external marker to adjudicate them would 
conservatively inhibit legal evolution.  Moreover, such markers are beyond 
present neuroscientific expertise. 
I believe that many of the claims for the relevance of neuroscience are 
best characterized as more “rhetorically relevant” than genuinely relevant.  
For example, defense advocates in capital punishment proceedings, in which 
the threshold for admissibility of mitigating evidence is considerably lower 
than at trial, hope that the fetching images produced by “real” neuroscience 
will be more persuasive to decision makers than evidence provided by 
apparently more suspect social and behavioral science, even if the advocate 
cannot say precisely how the neuroscience bears on a genuinely mitigating 
condition.  Having a brain lesion or injury is not a mitigating condition per se.  
The actual relevance of such brain abnormality evidence therefore requires an 
account of why the brain evidence makes it more likely than not that a 
genuine mitigating condition, such as lack of rational capacity, obtains. 
The foregoing consideration of relevance/translation has been general.  
Quite recently, however, we finally have preliminary data about how 
neuroscientific information is being used in criminal cases. Five very 
interesting empirical studies from the United States (Farahany 2015; Gaudet 
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and Marchant 2016), England and Wales (Catley and Claydon 2015), 
Canada (Chandler 2015), and the Netherlands (deKogel and Westgeest 
2015) have attempted to discover the extent to which and in what way 
neuroscientific evidence is used in criminal cases. The question is what they 
disclose about actual practice that may be a guide for future ethical practice. 
 All the studies focus on appellate cases reported in various data bases 
for somewhat different periods in the range of years from 2000 to 2012, and 
all are admirably cautious about the methodological limitations of the study 
sample. None purports to be an accurate representation of the use of 
neuroscientific evidence throughout the criminal justice system and other 
methodological quibbles may be raised, such as the failure to use 
independent interrater reliability for characterizing the cases. All use a very 
expansive definition of neuroscience that includes techniques and data that 
long antedate the new neuroscience. At most, the data are suggestive. 
Nonetheless, the studies are interesting and innovative. 
The late, great baseball scientist Yogi Berra was apocryphally quoted 
as saying “It’s déjà vu all over again.” The data indicate that the courts make 
the classic mistakes about the relevance of neuroscience and behavioral 
genetics to criminal cases that have bedeviled the reception of behavioral 
science in general and of psychiatry and psychology in particular. The 
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overarching classic mistake is misunderstanding or uncritically accepting the 
validity of apparently relevant science and misunderstanding the relevance 
of the science to the specific criminal law criteria at issue, which are, once 
again, primarily acts and mental states. In particular, courts too often do not 
understand the following issues (discussed previously). Metaphysical free 
will is not a criterion for any criminal law doctrine, and it is not even 
foundational for criminal responsibility in general. Causation in general and 
brain causation in particular, even causation by abnormal variables, are not 
per se a mitigating or excusing condition, and causation per se is not the 
equivalent of compulsion, which is an excusing condition. And, finally, 
people with the same diagnosis or condition are behaviorally heterogeneous, 
and, ultimately, it is the behavior that is legally relevant, not the diagnosis. 
In one form or another, most of these cases exhibit these mistakes and 
confusions. It is no surprise that one of the authors, Professor Nita Farahany, 
characterizes the cases as follows: “That use [of neurobiological research in 
criminal law] continues to be haphazard, ad hoc, and often ill conceived” 
(Farahany 2015, 488–489). 
Not surprisingly, sentencing decisions were the most common context 
for the introduction of neuroscience evidence because the bar for 
admissibility is lower than at trial.   It was also used to resolve questions 
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about many criminal responsibility doctrines and, surprisingly, about 
competence, which as we have seen, is a functional behavioral 
determination. Perhaps the most striking finding is how infrequently the new 
neuroscience of functional imaging and related techniques is used. This 
varies across jurisdictions, but the large majority of cases involve the “old” 
neurology or the old neuropsychology that uses classical structural imaging 
or behavioral methods to assess brain functioning associated with well-
characterized neurological conditions, such as epilepsy and frontal lobe 
injuries or lesions. Such diagnostic methods are far more common than 
fMRI, and, in the Dutch and Canadian samples, there is virtually no 
functional imaging evidence. 
In sum, these studies suggest that the influence of the new neuro-
investigative techniques applied to individual cases for forensic assessment 
is quite modest but confused nonetheless. Even when inferences are drawn 
in individual cases using group data about the consequences of various 
neurological conditions, the studies used are often classic behavioral studies 
rather than neuroimaging investigations. Indeed, careful examination of the 
expanded case studies that the papers present indicates that, in most 
instances, the neuroscientific evidence was far less important than the 
behavioral evidence, and the former was used largely to buttress the latter. 
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The neuroevidence was rarely dispositive, and, in the other cases, it is 
impossible to know from these papers’ summaries of the case reports how 
influential the additive neuroevidence was. 
The first question when considering the admissibility of scientific 
evidence, as always, is the degree to which the basis of the testimony has 
been established. We have already seen that legally relevant neuroscience is 
not well-established at present, which is no critique of contemporary 
neuroscience for the reasons previously given. For a specific example, the 
apparently wide but not universal Dutch acceptance of a brain disease model 
of addiction that guides legal decision-making fails to confront the hard 
questions about the status of the science. Judges are not yet in a good 
position to evaluate neuroscience and may be either too critical or too 
uncritical (see Rakoff 2016, for an analysis by a neuroscientifically informed 
federal judge).  
For another example, fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) plays a large role 
in the Canadian cases (although not in the other samples), but the potentially 
legally relevant aspects of the disorder are the cognitive and rationality 
defects, which are behavioral signs, that sufferers demonstrate from an early 
age. Are the brains of FAS sufferers different from the brains of those 
without the disorder? Of course. This is just a necessary truth of biological 
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materialism. If the behavior is markedly different, so will be the brain. Brain 
difference is not per se a mitigating or excusing condition, however. If a 
particular FAS sufferer is somehow sufficiently able rationally to regulate 
his behavior, then FAS is irrelevant to mitigation or excuse. Moreover, if a 
FAS sufferer exhibited lifelong cognitive defects, as many do, that sufferer 
is potentially excusable even if sophisticated neurotechniques cannot 
identify the brain pathology or brain difference. 
Many of the cases in these studies fail to understand the relevance of 
the neuroevidence. Even if there is clear evidence of brain damage or a 
neurological disorder, it does not mean that the defendant did not act, lacked 
mens rea, was less culpable, is incompetent, or will be dangerous in the 
future. All the criteria depend on direct assessment of the offender’s 
behavior. The alleged relevance of neuroevidence to competence 
determinations, which occurs in many of the samples, is instructive but 
bewildering. Criminal competencies are behaviorally functional and again 
defined entirely in terms of mental states and in infrequent cases also in 
terms of actions. Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges, 
can he rationally assist counsel, does he understand the consequence of a 
guilty plea, does he understand the nature of the penalty about to be imposed 
on him and why it is being imposed? These normative, mental criteria must 
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all be evaluated behaviorally. Either the defendant can perform these tasks to 
the requisite degree or he cannot. 
These are continuum capacities, however, and it may be asked 
whether neuroscience can help with the gray area, indeterminate cases. The 
answer is, no, for reasons that have already been addressed. Any brain 
condition will have heterogeneous consequences. Some people with very 
broken brains have essentially normal mental functioning. But, cannot group 
data about people with this condition help us draw inferences at the margin? 
Once again, the answer is, no, in the present state of neuroscience because of 
the “clear-cut” problem.  
A critical reader of the empirical studies will be repeatedly struck by 
how many of the expanded cases either used irrelevant or weak (or 
nonexistent) neuroscience—for example, to assess competence or whether a 
defendant suffered from a mental illness—or could have been fully resolved 
with more careful behavioral evaluation. Of course there can be conflict 
about the behavioral evidence, but because act and mental state questions 
must be resolved, it is the behavioral evidence that is doing the real work. 
And for the reasons given, neuroevidence will seldom be helpful in 
resolving the gray area cases in which most help is needed. 
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Much is at stake in criminal cases, and, of course, forensic 
practitioners and judges would like scientific help to advocate for their 
clients and to resolve the vexing issues they must resolve. At present, 
however, turning to the neuroscience will do nothing more in most cases 
than to provide a rationalization for a result the practitioner or judge wishes 
to reach on other grounds.  It is once again a matter of rhetorical rather than 
real relevance. Convergent behavioral and neurodata might help solve some 
of these problems that cannot be resolved with either type of evidence alone, 
but such convergent lines of legally relevant evidence are very rare. 
If a proper framework for the relevance of neuroscience to law is 
established and if a cautious approach to the science is adopted, I think 
neuroscience can potentially help.  It may refine legal mental state 
categories, such as mens rea and mental disorder, it might also help the 
fairness and efficiency of criminal law decision-making by increasing 
predictive accuracy. The criminal law already uses predictions for purposes 
of diversion, sentencing, parole, and the quasi-criminal commitment of some 
sexual offenders. We have already decided as a normative matter that 
predictions are acceptable. If neural variables make this practice more 
accurate at reasonably acceptable cost, that is an advance. Finally, in tandem 
with behavioral science, neuroscience might help us more accurately 
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understand legally relevant human capacities, such as the capacity for 
rationality and for self-control, which would again improve legal policy, 
doctrine, and adjudication. But all such optimistic outcomes will depend on 
precise understanding of legal relevance and valid science. 
 I shall end this section with an instructive anecdote that illustrates the 
point.  At a conference, I was presenting to a group of federal judges the case 
study of Spyder Cystkopf/Herbert Weinstein, a sixty-two-year-old retired 
business executive who had strangled his wife to death during a physically-
heated argument and then threw her out the twelfth story window of their 
apartment building (People v. Weinstein 1992; Morse 1996; “Spyder 
Cystkopf” was the pseudonym first used in the literature).  He was arrested 
and charged with murder.   It was later discovered that on the underside of the 
middle lining surrounding his brain, the arachnoid layer, he had a large, 
benign cyst that pressed on and displaced a large amount of his frontal cortex.  
The brain image showing the displacement is spectacularly arresting.  Based 
on this finding, the defendant was going to raise the insanity defense, 
claiming that he could not conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. 
The behavioral history and evidence were entirely inconsistent with the 
validity of this claim, however, and after presentation of both the prosecution 
and defense arguments, one hundred percent of the judges voted to convict.  I 
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then asked the judges if they would consider the cyst a mitigating factor at 
sentencing.  About a third of them indicated that they would consider it, so I 
asked them why.  The modal response was that the defendant had a proverbial 
“hole in his head.”  I asked why, if it didn’t affect his behavior, it should be 
considered a mitigating factor.  None of the judges who indicated a 
willingness to consider it had any adequate explanation except to repeat the 
(true) observation that the defendant had a gross anatomical abnormality.  
With respect, having such an abnormality is not per se an excusing or 
mitigating condition unless it produces a genuine mitigating condition such as 
diminished rationality or diminished control capacity.  But there was not a 
shred of evidence that the defendant had such problems.  The judges simply 
believed that such an abnormality simply “must” have mitigating 
implications, but the relevance was rhetorical rather than real.   
 
Conclusion: The Ethics of Caution 
 There is little consensus about what ethical conduct demands in most 
contexts (see Morse 2008, for a full discussion of this point in the context of 
forensic psychiatric ethics).  Probably most forensic practitioners would 
endorse the requirements of the “standard model” most ably advanced by Paul 
Appelbaum (1997): the forensic practitioner owes only the duty to act 
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respectfully and honestly towards the subject and to perform his forensic 
functions with the highest level of professional skill.  The standard model 
starts with impeccable moral pre-commitments to respect for persons and 
professional integrity.  It suggests that forensic practitioners can serve a 
socially important and useful function if they adhere to those pre-
commitments.  The model appeals to public reason.  Who could rationally 
object to this?   The question, of course, is what counts as the highest level 
of professional skill when using the very young methods and data of 
cognitive, affective and social neuroscience.   
The message of this chapter has been that the forensic practitioner 
must understand the legal question at issue, must understand the limits of 
neuroscience methods and data, and most importantly, must be able 
adequately to translate the mechanistic neuroscience information into the 
law’s folk psychological criteria.  There is nothing new in these prescriptions 
that wouldn’t apply to the use of any clinical or scientific information.  
Moreover, neuroscience techniques are not unusually invasive and cannot 
read minds, which would potentially raise hitherto unimaginable privacy 
issues.  If they increase the accuracy of prediction practices we already think 
are justified, justice is better done.  They can produce incidental findings, but 
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this, too, is a traditional issue.  When these findings must be disclosed to the 
subject is familiar ground. 
If this chapter is correct about the current limits and legal relevance of 
neuroscience, the most important ethical admonition for the practitioner is to 
be modest and cautious and not to make claims for the relevance of 
neuroscience that cannot be adequately defended conceptually and 
empirically.   Forensic psychiatrists and psychologists are not like some 
other experts, such as art authenticators, that have few objective criteria to 
help them form opinions.  We are expected to be more objective.  Even if 
mock juries in experimental work are not terribly swayed by the seemingly 
hyper-scientific findings of neuroscience, practitioners have a duty not to go 
beyond their data.  That is the gravest ethical lapse possible in this area.  I 
believe if we are suitably cautious, neuroscience may in the near future 
provide modest help in resolving forensic issues and using it would be 
proper.  At present, however, as the empirical studies disclose, that 
contribution is considerably less than many believe and that the law too 
often permits.  We must police ourselves. 
  In two recent contributions (Morse 2006, 2013), I provisionally 
identified a maladaptive pattern of behavior that I termed, “Brain Overclaim 
Syndrome (BOS).”  Suffering from this syndrome is the forensic 
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practitioner’s greatest ethical danger. Fueled by overconfidence in the state 
of the neuroscience, insufficient understanding of the law and the relation of 
the two, this disorder is marked by inflated claims for the usefulness of 
neuroscientific information to guide individual case adjudication, doctrinal 
change, legal policy, and specific legal practices.  The criterial signs and 
symptoms, all of which are provisional until they are fully validated 
empirically, are 1) confusion about the brain-mind-action connection; 2) 
overconfidence about the current state of neuroscience, especially as it 
relates to human action; 3) confusion about the distinction between an 
internal and external critique of legal doctrine and practices; 4) 
misunderstanding the criteria for responsibility, especially failure to 
recognize that the criteria are fully folk psychological; and 5) confusion of 
positive and normative claims, especially failure to recognize that a 
behavioral or neural difference between groups or individuals does not per 
se entail different legal treatment. Inflated claims for the legal relevance of 
neuroscience in the courtroom are simply one manifestation of BOS. 
 In the previous papers, I recommended Cognitive Jurotherapy (CJ) as 
the treatment of choice.  It is exceedingly safe, effective and inexpensive.  
Nevertheless, combing the relevant literatures and attending numerous 
neurolaw conferences since first identifying BOS convince me that the 
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syndrome is still endemic among writers, speakers and practitioners in the 
relevant fields and that, apparently, too few have received CJ.  Perhaps the 
Affordable Care Act or its potential replacement, if any, will remedy that to 
some degree. 
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